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RAIDs (Redundant Array of Independent Disks) are widely used in storage systems to
prevent data loss in case of hardware defects on a hard disk and to improve I/O perfor-
mance. In case the RAID controller fails or in the context of a forensic investigation, the
content of the RAID has to be reconstructed from the single disks or rather from disk
images. Due to the variety of RAID controllers and various implementation and conﬁgu-
ration possibilities, different parameters that are necessary for reconstruction are often
unknown. This might be the case because the original conﬁguration just has not been
documented or in the forensic case, the administrator might not be cooperating and not
willing to reveal the conﬁguration. Using the original RAID system in such cases is not an
option, too, because the original evidence should not be altered. We present a novel
approach to automatically detect all parameters to reassemble the logical RAID volume
based on block level entropy measurement and generic heuristics. We also provide a
performance-optimized open source implementation of our approach that is also able to
afterwards reassemble the entire logical RAID volume and to further recover single missing
disks using the redundancy information as present in RAID-5.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
4.0/).Introduction
Redundant Arrays of Independent1 Disks are a good way
to prevent data loss in case of hardware defects on hard
disks to a certain degree, while at the same time improving
I/O performance (Patterson et al., 1988). However, due to
the introduction of another abstraction layer between the
hard disks and the operating system, it becomes harder to
reconstruct the ﬁle system data from the set of disks in case
the RAID controller can not be used, as data is distributed
among the disks. Due to the variety of hardware and soft-
ware RAID controllers available and different imple-
mentation and conﬁguration possibilities, the RAID type, as
well as other important information, such as stripe size and
stripe map, may be unknown. Usually, all those parametersbek).
.
ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWSneed to be determined to allow correct reassembly of the
RAID volume (Arpaci-Dusseau and Arpaci-Dusseau, 2012;
Katz, 2010). If some of the parameters are not known, raw
disk contents have to be manually examined by specialized
analysts to determine the right parameters, making RAID
reassembly a complex and expensive task today (Xiang
et al., 2010).
Motivation
In the ﬁeld of forensic computing (also called digital
forensics), where accessing data on previously seized and
imaged hard disks is the basis for many investigations,
RAID reassembly is speciﬁcally important in analysis of
server environments, most of which use RAID systems in
order to guarantee failure safety. To allow for evidence
collection, the RAID volume has to be reconstructed from
the single disk images, where the original RAID system can
not be used (to not alter the evidence), and where the. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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the case because the original conﬁguration has not been
documented after its installation or because the adminis-
trator/owner might not be cooperating and thus be not
willing to reveal the conﬁguration. As such constellations
occur regularly in today's investigations, forensic tools are
needed that allow for automated reconstruction of the
RAID. Common forensic tools already support reassembling
the logical RAID volume from single disk images, but the
investigator has to know all the parameters and provide
them to the software. If the conﬁguration is not known, the
only remaining option is the already mentioned manual
recovery, which is often too time-consuming and expen-
sive. Thus in 2012, in his talk on the DEF CON 20 conference,
Michael Perklin even suggested using custom RAID pa-
rameters as an effective anti-forensics measure (Perklin,
2012).
Contributions
We present a novel approach to automatically detect all
the relevant RAID parameters in a generic way using block
level entropy measurement and generic heuristics. We
then use these parameters to reassemble the original RAID
volume. More speciﬁcally, we employ a heuristic based on
entropy patterns of ﬁles that allow us to ﬁnd possible lo-
cations of stripe boundaries and potential points of cohe-
sion across the different hard disks. This way, we gather
indications for possible RAID types and parameters from
which we detect the original conﬁguration. We provide an
open source prototype2 that is able to detect the following
parameters of RAID-0, RAID-1 and RAID-5:
1. The RAID type
2. Stripe size
3. Stripe map and Disk order
Our prototype is also able to automatically reconstruct a
single missing hard disk in case of a RAID-5 system using
the parity information of the RAID and to reassemble the
complete logical RAID volume as a single disk image. Using
our implementation, we evaluate the performance and
correctness of our proposed method.
Related work
Entropy-based heuristics are already used in some sce-
narios that are quite different from our approach: The work
of Xiong et al. (2014) introduces an approach of using en-
tropy to evaluate risk factors for certainmovement patterns
acquired from mobile device users. That way, conclusions
about the security of mobile devices can be drawn by
examining entropy patterns. In geographical regions where
the user moves most of the time, the entropy is very low
and so is the risk factor. This allows for risk-based
authentication. The work described in Yokota et al. (2007)
shows the use of entropy of control ﬂow branching2 https://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/content/forensic-raid-
recovery/.histories to quantitatively describe the regularity level of
program behavior to improve branch prediction
performance.
Garﬁnkel et al. (2010) describe the use of purpose-built
functions and cryptographic hashes in the context of small
block forensics. Their work has two different parts: Block
hash calculations and bulk data analysis. The hash allows to
detect compressed data and similarity and they use it to
improve detection of JPEG, MPEG and compressed data for
classifying forensic contents of a drive in case of data
carving. A possible extention of our work could be to use
their hash additionally or instead of entropy in order to
detect the RAID parameters in future work.
Xiang (2011) describes an approach to recover data from
a RAID-6 system. In contrast to the RAID systems used in
this paper, RAID-6 provides higher level of reliability
through two parity stripes. RAID-6 codes like RDP protect
data against up to two disk failures (Corbett et al., 2004).
Once a single disk failure is detected on the running RAID-6
system, recovery is initiated without aborting application
activity on the system. This approach attempts to reduce
the number of reads required for recovery to minimize the
performance impact for other applications. In contrast to
our approach, this approach works on a running system
and therefore with knowledge over all RAID parameters.
Kiselev et al. (2006) describe an approach to automati-
cally detect corrupt data in a parity RAID system and pro-
vide recovery. With two different parity data they can
determine, if data is corrupt and restore the original data.
Belhadj et al. (2003) describe how the rebuilding of data
on a RAID system can be prioritized using a vulnerable data
redundancy scheme. This scheme can be determined by
comparing probability of losing data and the potential for
one or more disk failures.
The work presented by Hart (2002) describes an auto-
matic approach to restore the conﬁguration of a RAID sys-
tem after a system failure, when the operating system is
running on that RAID system.
The algorithm described by Goel and Corbett protects
from three-disk-failures (Goel and Corbett, 2012) using
three parity disks in respect to three recoverable disks.
We further want to name two existing (non-academic)
tools for RAID reconstruction: RAID Reconstructor (v 4.32)3
and ReclaiMe (build 1994).4 In our evaluation, we compare
both tools to our approach.Outline
This paper is structured as follows: In Prerequisites, we
provide the theoretical prerequisites for this work and
recall the speciﬁcations of different RAID types and their
parameters, as well as entropy. Parameter detection using
entropy describes our approach of entropy-based param-
eter detection in detail. We evaluate the correctness of our
approach, as well as its performance in Evaluation and
conclude in Summary.3 https://www.runtime.org/raid.htm.
4 http://www.reclaime.com/library/how-to-recover-raid.aspx.
Table 1
Parity and data block distributions for Raid-5.
Disk 0 Disk 1 Disk 2 Disk 3
(a) Left-asymmetric
0 1 2 P
3 4 P 5
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In this section, we recall the important basics for our
approach. To this end, we ﬁrst outline the functional prin-
ciple of RAIDs, the different RAID types, and the parameters
that are relevant for reassembling the volume.We then also
brieﬂy review the deﬁnition of entropy and provide some
examples to give a ﬁrst intuition of why entropy can be
used to obtain the information about the previously
mentioned RAID parameters.
RAID types and parameters
RAID is a means of unifying multiple physical hard disk
drives to a single logical volume. The main idea of RAID
systems is to achieve redundancy which is used to guar-
antee additional safety in case of hard disk failures and
increase I/O performance (Chen et al., 1994). These advan-
tages make RAID systems especially viable for server en-
vironments. However, the technology is also applied by
private individuals in small network-attached storage
(NAS) solutions. As aforementioned, RAID systems operate
transparently to the ﬁle system and appear as one logical
device. This is achieved by having a so-called RAID
controller to perform read/write operations on the hard
disks in their respective, redundancy-aware manner. Said
redundancy allows for a complete recovery of the contents
of a broken hard disk drive without losing data. Depending
on the RAID types used, which we revisit now, the required
recovery procedures differ in complexity and error
tolerance.
Most RAID types use striping across the single hard disk
devices to increase read and write performance. Striping
refers to distributing data blocks (so called stripes of a
speciﬁed stripe size) sequentially over the devices ﬁrstly
and over physical addresses secondly, so that data on a disk
is not contiguous. The resulting stripe map describes the
mapping of logical data blocks to their physical location in
the array of disks. This location consists of the device a
given data block is located on and its address (offset) on
that device. Depending on the RAID controller, stripe sizes
may be chosen. The smallest possible stripe size is the size
of a hard disk sector (512 Byte), yet there is no upper limit
deﬁned.
The most basic example for striping is RAID-0, where
the stripe map describes a linearization of the data blocksFig. 1. Example for data block distribution of a RAID-0 system with four
disks.over the devices, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Since data can be
written and read in parallel, the I/O performance is sped up,
ideally by a factor equal to the number of devices. However,
any complete hard drive failure results in unrecoverable
and non contiguous data and therefore in complete data
loss. The stripe map only consists of the disk order.
While RAID-0 provides striping and no redundancy,
RAID-1 poses an alternative without striping but redun-
dancy, where the logical drive is mirrored across physical
drives. Any number of hard disk drives may fail, as long as
one remains intact, and recovery is trivial. Since no striping
occurs, there is a performance gain by reading data, but a
bottleneck imposed on writing by the slowest writing de-
vice. RAID-1 only leaves 1/n of the system's accumulated
space available, for n equally sized hard disks.
All other RAID types provide redundancy via parity bits,
which are usually realized by a bit-wise XOR. The approach
presented in this work does not provide support for RAID-2
through RAID-4 types, which have been succeeded by
RAID-5 and are thus rarely used in the ﬁeld.
Along with RAID-0 and RAID-1, RAID-5 is the most
commonly used RAID type. It combines redundancy
through parity and performance through striping, thus
three hard disks are at least required. There are different
types of parity and data block distribution, as explained in
great detail by Lee (1990). In general, the resulting stripe
map of the distribution is repeated after n rows, with n
being the number of hard disks. Those distribution types
are illustrated for 4 disks in Table 1. There are two prop-
erties with two possible states each, namely {left, right}
and {symmetric, asymmetric}. Left-sided distributions shift
their parity blocks from the last disk to the ﬁrst, while
right-sided ones arrange them in a ﬁrst-to-last manner.
Symmetry refers to starting the row-wise data sequence
after the parity block, whereas asymmetric placement be-
gins each row on the ﬁrst available disk of that row (Lee,
1990).6 P 7 8
P 9 10 11
(b) Right-asymmetric
P 0 1 2
3 P 4 5
6 7 P 8
9 10 11 P
(c) Left-symmetric
0 1 2 P
4 5 P 3
8 P 6 7
P 9 10 11
(d) Right-symmetric
P 0 1 2
5 P 3 4
7 8 P 6
9 10 11 P
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1, because instead of using 1/n1n of the system's accumu-
lated space for data, only 1/n1n of the space is used for parity
and the remaining disk space is available for data storage. If
all data is to be restored without loss of information, a
maximum of one hard disk failure is tolerated. By spreading
the parity information over multiple devices, the load is
equally balanced and the performance of RAID-5 behaves
just like its storage efﬁciency for the same reason: All disks
but one contain actual payload.
All those parameters, namely RAID type, stripe size,
stripe map and of course the disk order need to be deter-
mined to be able to reassemble a RAID volume. Deter-
mining all of those requires a heuristic approach, since
testing all possibilities for consistency (i.e. brute forcing) is
not viable as we show in Bruteforce performance
estimation. The underlying concept of the heuristics
introduced in this work is informational entropy, which we
want to explain next.Informational entropy
Entropy essentially is the expectancy value of informa-
tion content. For a discrete probability distribution
(p1,p2,…) entropy is deﬁned by Eq. (1), as alsomentioned by
Devroye and Luc (1996).
H ¼ 
X
i
pi  logðpiÞ (1)
This means, entropy describes how much different in-
formation of length n can be found in a given sequence of
data. For example, let the sequence of data be a stream of
eight consecutive logical data units, and let the length of
information n be two. Each single data unit can take the
values 0 and 1. In consequence, information of the length
two can only be described by four possible values, namely
00, 01, 10 or 11. If the stream only consists of one kind of
value, information of only this type is encountered and the
entropy is zero (Shannon, 2001). The greatest entropy is
always achieved if all possible values of information occur
equally often. As shown in Table 2, the highest entropy for
this example is two. The ﬁrst table shows exemplarily the
results if only one type of information is present. The sec-
ond table shows an example for maximum entropy in this
simple example, where all possible values occur equally
often.Table 2
Example for relation between information content and entropy.
# p p log2ðpÞ
00 4 1.0 0
01 0 0.0 0
10 0 0.0 0
11 0 0.0 0
H ¼ P
i
pi  log2ðpiÞ ¼ 0
00 1 0.25 0.5
01 1 0.25 0.5
10 1 0.25 0.5
11 1 0.25 0.5
H ¼ P
i
pi  log2ðpiÞ ¼ 2Generally, the lowest entropy is zero, while the highest
entropy is n. Since text ﬁles have a limited range of values
(because only printable characters are used, and for
example the letter ‘e’ is very common, while special char-
acters like ‘#’ are rarely used) the entropies of blocks over a
whole ﬁle are rather low (Shannon, 2001). To get higher
entropies, the content of a ﬁle has to be fairly randomwith
many different values. For example, compressed ﬁles have a
higher entropy, since redundancy is eliminated and the
randomness is increased. The other way round, in a
completely random ﬁle, nothing can be compressed
(Salomon and Motta, 2010). As a result, the entropy of any
block of an compressed ﬁle or a ﬁle that contains arbitrary
binary data is rather high, as well as the entropy of the
entire ﬁle.
We make use of this fact to detect data boundaries as
explained in the next section. The algorithms described
there calculate the entropy with the information length of
one byte. Thus we have 28 possibilities for each byte to
differ, the highest entropy for each block is log2ð28Þ ¼ 8,
and the size of a block has to be a multiple of 28.
Parameter detection using entropy
In order to reconstruct a logical RAID volume, all the
previously explained parameters of the RAID system have
to be known. We detect those parameters in the following
order, as they partly depend on each other:
1. RAID type
2. Stripe size
3. Stripe map
4. Data offset
All of those can be determined using heuristics on block
level entropy of the disk contents. Those different heuris-
tics for each of the parameters are explained in the given
order in the following sections.RAID type
As described in RAID types and parameters, the data
blocks (stripes) in a RAID can be mirrored over different
disks or striped with or without parity information. In
order to detect which RAID type has originally been used,
occurrences of mirrored or parity blocks are counted, as
well as blocks that cannot be assigned. The RAID type can
then be determined as seen in Table 3 on the following
page. In this table, RAID-5i denotes an incomplete RAID-5
system with missing disks, whereas RAID-5c is a com-
plete one.Table 3
Overview of the relation between the number of found blocks with the
respective property and the determined RAID type.
RAID-0 RAID-1 RAID-5c RAID-5i
mirrored low high low mean
parity low low high mean
unassigned high low low high
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contain parity information, or can not be assigned, we
proceed as follows: The algorithm examines the ﬁrst 5
million non-zero 512-Byte (smallest possible stripe size)
blocks of each disk. Using a bit-wise XOR, the algorithm can
determine if a block is mirrored onto another disk (XOR
results in 0-bytes only) or if a block with parity information
has been found. Using this information, the RAID type can
be derived in the following way:
As RAID-1 has mirrored disks, the XOR of any two blocks
evaluate to zero. Therefore, most examined blocks have to
be mirrored if all disks are correct. RAID-5 uses parity
blocks for failure safety which are also calculated with a
XOR operation. For this reason, in a RAID-5, the XOR of a
block of all disks is calculated, it should evaluate to zero.
This way, the algorithm ﬁnds many parity blocks on a
complete RAID-5 system.
Since RAID-5 can be recovered with one missing disk,
the algorithm has to detect the difference between a RAID-
0 and an incomplete RAID-5 system. Both RAID systems
have a lot of blocks that are neither mirrored nor have
redundant information. Still, if the missing disk of a RAID-5
system has empty blocks, then mirrored and parity blocks
can be found on the remaining system. The heuristic re-
spects this case and expects a certain number of unassigned
blocks, as can be seen in Eq. (2), where n denotes the
number of disks:
mirrored<
100 unassigned
nþ 1 (2)
However, if the number of mirrored blocks and blocks
with redundant information is too low, than those occur-
rences could be coincidences. That's why both values
summed up should be a fraction of the number of unas-
signed blocks. Those two conditions are sufﬁcient to
distinguish an incomplete RAID-5 system from a RAID-
0 system.Table 4
Entropy distribution of a 1.75 MB ﬁle over four disks using RAID-0.
Address Disk 0 Disk 1 Disk 2 Disk 3
…
888273920 0 0 0 0
888274432 0 0 0 0
888274944 0 7.50199 7.56131 7.57583
888275456 0 7.53411 7.54758 7.54145
…
888306176 0 7.46816 7.43265 7.48876
888306688 0 7.43318 7.59278 7.60496
888307200 6.14066 7.48741 7.58424 7.49408
888307712 7.64113 7.53735 7.59764 7.46034
…
888732672 7.43689 7.55090 7.52364 7.54029
888733184 7.52416 7.54816 7.57045 7.53455
888733696 7.44034 7.54581 7.46290 0
888734208 7.47576 7.51771 7.57273 0
…Stripe size
The length of information for calculating the entropy of a
block is chosen to be one byte. With one byte having
28¼ 256 possible values, the block size has to be at least 256
byte. If the length was chosen to be two byte, the blocks to
determine the stripe size have to be at least 512-byte blocks.
This is already the smallest possible stripe size and thus we
can not increase it further without loosing compatibility
with this stripe size. To decrease the length to less than one
byte makes no sense because one byte is typically the
smallest data unit used. Thus, the only two remaining pos-
sibilities for block sizes that can be chosen for entropy
calculation in our approach are 256 and 512 byte blocks and
one or two byte information length. We chose 512-byte
blocks with one byte information length as basis for our
calculations, as this showed to decrease the impact of out-
liers in entropy and thus provided the best results.
As mentioned in Prerequisites, the entropies within a
certain ﬁle remain roughly the same. Thus, great differ-
ences in entropy of consecutive blocks may indicate the
beginning of a new stripe. An example for an entropydistribution on a RAID-0 system with image ﬁles is shown
in Table 4:
The high entropy shows the content of the ﬁle. It is
surrounded by empty blocks. The possible stripe size can be
derived using the addresses of the blocks with a high dif-
ference in entropy, i.e. the ﬁle boundaries. In this example,
address 888274944 indicates the beginning of a stripe. The
entropy on Disk 1 to Disk 3 have a lot of blocks with low
entropy before, until the value changes abruptly to z7.5
while the entropy on Disk 0 remains zero. This difference in
entropy is unusual for a consecutive written ﬁle as the
entropy should not change severely in such a case. It is also
untypical for the beginning of a ﬁle, thus it can be inter-
preted as the beginning of a stripe.
The end of a stripe can be located at address 888733184,
since there is also an abrupt change of value on Disk 3. This
discontinuity to the following 512-byte block is unlikely
found within a ﬁle and at the end of a ﬁle, the entropy
usually slightly drops before it reaches zero (at least when
the end of the ﬁle is not exactly on a stripe border), simi-
larly to the beginning of the ﬁle. As a consequence, a new
stripe block starts at address 888733696, where the ﬁle
continues on disks 0 to 2. To ensure that a strongly altering
ﬁle with partly low entropy does not inﬂuence this
approach, the surrounding entropies are also taken into
account. In case of an abrupt change of entropy from very
low to very high, the values before the change have to stay
at the same low level, whereas after the change, the values
have to stay higher than a certain threshold. The best
threshold may vary depending on the examined case,
which is evaluated and explained in Evaluation. The pre-
sented algorithm checks sixteen 512-byte blocks of en-
tropies before and after the entropy change. If the entropy
changes from high to low, this procedure is also applied the
other way round.
To ﬁnally estimate the possible stripe size, the difference
between two consecutive addresses is calculated. The
result has to be a multiple of the possible stripe size and is
classiﬁed using modulo operations of reasonable stripe
sizes. The largest applicable divisor of the modulo opera-
tions, where the remainder is zero, is taken as a potential
C. Zoubek et al. / Digital Investigation 16 (2016) S44eS54 S49stripe size. This is calculated for the entire discs and in the
end, the potential stripe size that occurred for most ad-
dresses is assumed to be the original stripe size. (In fact,
usually the ﬁgures are very unambiguous, as we show in
our evaluation in Evaluation.)
Possible offset
Since Software-RAID systems need reserved space for
their own metadata, an offset to the actual RAID system
must be known. In case of RAID systems created with the
toolmdadm (version 3.2.5), a superblock with details about
the conﬁguration of the RAID system is stored 4 KB after
start of each device. Depending on the disk layout, the RAID
system and the type of the Software-RAID, the offset to the
actual RAID system may vary.
The algorithm to determine the stripe size, as already
discussed in Stripe size, was extended to provide additional
offset detection. After the stripe size has been determined,
the difference between two addresses, that have lead to the
stripe size determination, is calculated. The result of the
difference has to be a multiple of the stripe size. That way it
can be assumed that these addresses indicate a correct
stripe withing the RAID system. Since those addresses are
most certainly within the ﬁle data of the RAID system, the
lower address of the calculated difference is taken as the
maximal possible offset. This offset is then taken modulo
with the stripe size and the result is the lower bound for the
offset algorithm. That way the maximal range is deter-
mined, in which the striping of the RAID system should
begin.
Between this range a search algorithm is applied to ﬁnd
magic values at certain offsets for different ﬁle system
metadata structures. In case of a partition table, the magic
value 0x55aa is found at offset 0x01fe (decimal: 510). Also
ﬁle systems like NTFS with NTFS as magic value, or Ext with
0xef53 as magic number, are supported. The smallest
possible offset, which can be detected using these magic
values, is taken as the Software-RAID offset and is used on
all disks.
Stripe map
After determining the stripe size and a possible offset,
the stripe map has to be reconstructed for RAID-0 and
RAID-5 systems. For this purpose, we make use of the fact
that the striped data blocks are written consecutively
across the hard disks. As a result, empty data blocks can
deliver a hint if this block was written before or after
another non-empty stripe block. This depends on the en-
tropy distribution of surrounding blocks. We divide each
stripe into two parts and calculate the entropy for each part
individually to detect falling and rising edges in entropy
within a stripe. Falling edges may be an indicator for the
end of a ﬁle, whereas a rising edge indicates the beginning
of a ﬁle.
If such an edge is found, the address is considered to be
of interest. Furthermore, the data blocks of those border
candidate addresses on the other disks are examined. An
empty block has to be written before the data block with a
rising edge or after a data block with a falling edge. Thatway, the disk order can be derived and more importantly
the write order of the data blocks. As mentioned in
Prerequisites for a RAID-0 system, only the disk order is
required.
In case of a RAID-5 system, there are different rows of
the stripe map that have to be considered, as well as the
parity block distribution that has to be determined, as
already explained in Prerequisites. The border candidate
addresses are used to calculate the position within the
stripe map, as shown in Eq. (3). Let n be the number of hard
disks of the RAID system and s be the determined stripe
size. The rowof the stripemap r is then calculated using the
border candidate address a in the following way:
r ¼
a
s

modðnÞ (3)
To determine the parity distribution for RAID-5 systems,
non-zero data blocks are examined, again using entropy.
Since parity blocks are calculated by XOR, their content is
usually more random than the content of the correspond-
ing data blocks (for non-empty blocks). Those found parity
blocks are counted and are associated with an entry in the
stripemap. Using Eq. (3), the positionwithin the stripemap
is calculated. The ﬁnal distribution of parity blocks is quite
reliable, so that it can be set with certainty. Examples for
bound cases of possible parity block distributions are
shown in Evaluation.
The described information is used to determine the type
of the RAID-5 system. As mentioned in Prerequisites, a
RAID-5 system can be {left, right} and {asymmetric, sym-
metric}. For this purpose, the parity distribution provides
an initial situation. Afterwards, the type of the RAID-5
system can be determined by applying the following
simpliﬁed algorithm:For each row in the stripe map, the hard disk with the
parity block is located. Then, the previously written data
block on that hard disk is examined. In every row, this data
block has to be the ﬁrst block or the last block to be written
C. Zoubek et al. / Digital Investigation 16 (2016) S44eS54S50for a right symmetric or respectively a left symmetric RAID-
5 system. In the asymmetric case, these data blocks have to
be in a ascending or descending order e respective to the
rows in the stripe map e to indicate a right or a left RAID-5
system. These patterns can also be seen in Table 1 on page 3
in Prerequisites.
Evaluation
In this section, our approach is evaluated using our
implementation. For the different kinds of RAID types and
for different data sets, the stability, performance and cor-
rectness was tested.Data set
In order to evaluate our approach on a realistic data set,
we used the hardware RAID controller the Adaptec®6405
Family Controller. To cover different RAID types, as well as
different stripe sizes and ﬁle systems, we combined each of
those with each other. In addition, for each of those cases,
we generated two variants with the most problematic
border cases regarding entropy measurement: Disks with
low-entropy data (text ﬁles) and high entropy data (com-
pressed picture ﬁles, i.e. JPEGs).
 RAID types: RAID-0, RAID-5 (as discussed before, RAID-1
is trivial)
 Stripesizes: 16 KB, 64 KB, 256 KB, 1024 KB
 File system: Ext4 and NTFS
 Data: Picture ﬁles and crawled text, and picture ﬁles
Thus, we obtained 2 4 2 2 ¼ 32 RAID systems
with 4 disks each of 10 GB size and additionally three
500 GB Ubuntu Linux system disks for RAID-0 and for
RAID-5, which makes up 38 RAID systems with a total of
152 hard disk images on which we evaluated our proposed
method. Furthermore several RAID-5 systems were created
using the tool mdadm to evaluate the correctness of the
offset detection for Software-RAIDs.
In order to provide a data set that not only covers the
potentially most problematic cases, but also is as close as
possible to real world images, the images with an Ubuntu
Linux installation have further been in use to ensure that
data was also moved, allocated and deallocated on the
image.Fig. 2. Distribution of stripe size algorithm reliability using certain entropy
threshold combinations. The higher the value on the z-axis, the better the
reliability. The other axes show the tested entropies for upper and lower
thresholds.Determining optimal thresholds
As already mentioned in Parameter detection using
entropy, certain thresholds for the differences in entropy
need to be set to ﬁnd the stripe size. For different data sets
and ﬁle systems, the optimal thresholds differ. Still, there
exist multiple threshold combinations for every data set
with which the recovery was successful. Calculating in-
tersections of these combinations, we determined a uni-
versal threshold. Alternatively, thresholds could be set for
the speciﬁc case, if there is enough prior knowledge of the
characteristics of the ﬁles and the ﬁle system, but our
evaluation shows that this is not necessary.Fig. 2 on page 11 shows some selected examples for the
hit rate for the correct stripe size (y-axis) depending on the
chosen different upper and lower thresholds (x- and z-
axis), for detecting the stripe size. Subﬁgure 2a shows that
the combination of NTFS and large picture ﬁles is greatly
independent of the chosen thresholds and is very robust.
Since there only occur high entropies from the picture ﬁles
Table 5
Parity distributions of the stripe map for different RAID-5 setups.
Disk 0 Disk 1 Disk 2 Disk 3
(a) Parity distribution for picture ﬁles
0 4958 0 0
0 0 5002 0
0 0 0 4911
4922 0 0 0
(b) Parity distribution for small ﬁles
485 480 497 3805
469 512 3808 478
499 3785 490 498
3800 518 442 510
C. Zoubek et al. / Digital Investigation 16 (2016) S44eS54 S51(z7:9)and very low entropies from empty blocks (z0:0) e
which are the edge cases e the chosen thresholds do not
cause different results. The other two distributions, shown
in Fig. 2b and c, show a difference in the results. The peak of
both graphs is achieved with a high distance between both
thresholds. Many different types of ﬁles, as exemplarily
encountered in operating systems, lead to highly varying
entropies. Hence, consecutive stripe blocks are more difﬁ-
cult to be told apart. As a consequence, the thresholds must
be chosen more carefully to not misinterpret an entropy
change within a ﬁle as the beginning of a new stripe block.
In the end, the best lower and upper thresholds are esti-
mated depending on those results. For all cases of the data
set described in Data set the most ﬁtting thresholds are 0.3
for the lower threshold and 7.3 for the upper one, in a way,
that in the average the best results can be achieved using
these thresholds.
Correctness
As described in Parameter detection using entropy, the
border candidate addresses are used to calculate potential
stripe sizes. Fig. 3 shows potential stripe size distributions
using the previously determined thresholds with the y-axis
being the probability of the stripe sizes. For all graphs, the
result is obvious and the correct stripe size can be
determined.
As argued in Parameter detection using entropy, parity
blocks of a stripe should have the greatest entropy within a
row.We veriﬁed this assumption using our data set and the
results shown in Table 5 on the following page, which
displays the found parity distributions for different RAID-5
stripe maps. Table 5a shows an explicit parity distribution,
since the large picture ﬁles have uniform entropy values. In
contrary to Table 5b, the picture ﬁles may be greater than
the size of a stripe, what makes great changes in entropy
unlikely. A lot of small ﬁles can cause high changes in en-
tropy inbetween a stripe block. Although in this case,
shown in Table 5b, the parity map is not that obvious, it still
can be accurately derived.
In case of a RAID-0 system, the parity distribution can
not be determined, since this RAID type does not support
parity information. The calculation of the resulting stripe
map depends only on the disk order.Fig. 3. Probability distribution of potential stripe sizes for certain cases. The
peaks indicate the stripe size for the speciﬁc case.We applied our implementation on all the RAID systems
from our previously described data set and let it reconstruct
the logical RAID volume. We veriﬁed the correct reassembly
by mounting the resulting images and analyzing both the
partition tables and ﬁle system metadata.
For all cases in the data set but one, our tool could
successful detect all necessary parameters automatically
and reassemble the original RAID volume. The only not
recoverable case is the RAID-0 system with Ext4 as a ﬁle
system, a lot of small ﬁles and a large stripe size. This
combination of a large stripe size with very small ﬁles on
RAID-0, where no parity information is present, is a prob-
lematic case, since there is not enough information pro-
vided to successfully recover the correct disk order
automatically. In such a case, the investigator has to provide
the original disk order if known, or try out different orders,
which is n! and for many real cases with 3 disks (at most 6
tries) or maybe even 4 disks (24 tries) still might be
reasonable. Yet the algorithmmay already ﬁnd some part of
the order.Performance
Finally, we evaluated the runtime performance of our
prototype, to underline the practical applicability of our
approach and to demonstrate that the overhead for calcu-
lating the entropy values in order to automatically detect
the needed RAID parameters does not render the approach
useless. Measurements were taken with the following
setup:
 CPU: Intel©i5-760; 4 Cores @ 2.8 GHz
 8 GB RAM @1.333 GHz
 Disks connected via SATA-2
Detecting all parameters of a RAID system with 40 GB
needs z4:5 minutes for best cases and up to 8.5 min for
worse scenarios. The greatest decrease in performance
occur if disks are barely ﬁlled with data. In this case, for
each parameter to detect the disks have to be fully searched
to ﬁnd enough indications.
For the recovery of lost disks, the write performance
reached an average of 65 MB/s. The reassembly of the
whole system (without a missing disk, or after it has been
recovered) reached a write performance of 138 MB/s. This
Table 6
Evaluation results of ReclaiMe for RAID 0.
FS Stripe S. Content Cor. Incor. not found Error
Ext 512 Ubuntu x
Ext 128 Ubuntu x
Ext 32 Ubuntu x
NTFS 16 Pictures x
NTFS 64 Pictures x
NTFS 256 Pictures x
NTFS 1024 Pictures x
Ext 16 Pictures x
Ext 64 Pictures x
Ext 256 Pictures x
Ext 1024 Pictures x
NTFS 16 Crawl x
NTFS 64 Crawl x
NTFS 256 Crawl x
NTFS 1024 Crawl x
Ext 16 Crawl x
Ext 64 Crawl x
Ext 256 Crawl x
Ext 1024 Crawl x
Sum 10 0 6 3
% 52.6 0 31.6 15.8
The bold text are the sums of the upper values.
C. Zoubek et al. / Digital Investigation 16 (2016) S44eS54S52means, it takes about 12 min and 22 s for recovery of
100 GB if all disks are present.
Bruteforce performance estimation
In those rare cases where a custom conﬁguration has
been used, where no parameters are known, and the
automated detection fails, the only remaining alternative
approach is to bruteforce the parameters. In the worst case,
each possible combination of the parameters would have to
be tested. For each tried combination, at least a part of the
image has to be recovered to run some consistency tests to
detect, whether the right parameters have been chosen or
not. Depending on the data on the image and the ﬁle sys-
tem used this is not a trivial task, but we want at least to
give some hints. One possible approach would be to detect
the ﬁle system used, then guess in which part of the entire
image the ﬁle system metadata is usually stored to reas-
semble this part (respecting offsets) and then try to inter-
pret the ﬁle system structures to obtain a listing of the root
directory, for example. Even if this succeeds this does not
ensure that everything has been assembled right, because
all the information might ﬁt in a single or only few
consecutive stripes, so that a partially correct reconstruc-
tion would be enough to pass this check. However, such a
test could reveal possible candidates of correct conﬁgura-
tion guesses, which can then be used to fully reassemble
the logical volume under the assumption that the conﬁg-
uration is correct andmanually search for the correct image
among those candidates.
To give an intuition of the effort that has to be done in
such a case, we want to show how to calculate the number
of possible conﬁgurations, using our data set as an example.
Let then s denote the possible values of the stripe size, r be
the number of possible RAID types except RAID-1 andm be
the possible conﬁgurations of the stripe map. Since RAID-1
has only one conﬁguration, this case must be counted on
top. ThenN is the resulting number of conﬁgurations which
have to be tested:
N ¼ ðsm rÞ þ 1 (4)
Here, s can take ten different values since the stripe size
can be set from 1 KB to 1024 KB. The RAID type r can be
RAID-0 and RAID-5whichmakes two options (since RAID-1
is trivial and does not need reconstruction if at least one
image is given). Generally, the stripe map conﬁguration
depends on the distribution of the blocks in one row across
the disks, which makes P! possibilities for P being the
number of devices. If the four different conﬁgurations of
the stripe map are taken into account, as they are described
in Sec. 2 and for example four devices, as in our evaluation
data set, m would be calculated as P! 4 ¼ 96. Thus, we
would end up with N ¼ ð10 96 2Þ þ 1 ¼ 1;921 possible
conﬁgurations for our example RAID systems.
Comparison to other tools
We now want to draw a short comparison of our
implementation with the two already mentioned existing
tools RAID Reconstructor and ReclaiMe.RAID Reconstructor cannot detect RAID types automati-
cally, but it is able to ﬁnd the start sector. It uses differen-
tiate entropy to analyze the RAID to this end. Yet the
entropy is mostly too low to determine any parameter and
the tool aborts with the message “This result is not signif-
icant”. Unfortunately, RAID Reconstructor fails for all the
images in our previously described test dataset.
ReclaiMe lacks the ability to automatically detect RAID
types, but, compared to our tool, it additionally supports
the detection of parameters for nested RAID arrays.
ReclaiMe is able to handle most of the images in our data
set but in some cases is unable to ﬁnd the necessary pa-
rameters, detects wrong parameters and thus fails, or exits
with a “blank Disk error” (the tool assumes the disk images
are empty, which is not the case). The detailed evaluation
results of ReclaiMe for our data set are shown in Table 6 for
the RAID 0 images, of which 52.6% are reconstructed
correctly, and in Table 7 for the RAID 5 images, of which
only 15.8% are correct. Especially, for RAID systems with
large stripesizes (e.g. 1024 KB) can hardly be recovered. In
the cases for which the parameter detection works, it takes
around 23 min for the 40 GB RAID systems on our previ-
ously described test hardware setup compared to the
4.5e8.5 min that our tool takes for the detection. Thus our
tool provides better results (detects all but one test cases
correctly) and is even much faster than ReclaiMe.
Summary
In this work, we presented a novel approach to auto-
matically detect relevant RAID parameters in a generic way
using block level entropy to reassemble the original RAID
volume. By using entropy, the presented algorithm is able
to ﬁnd possible locations of stripe boundaries and potential
points of cohesion across the different hard disks to esti-
mate the stripe size and the stripe map of the RAID system.
We provide a ready-to-use implementation for the
Table 7
Evaluation results of ReclaiMe for RAID 5.
FS Stripe S. Content Cor. Incor. not found Error
Ext 512 Ubuntu x
Ext 128 Ubuntu x
Ext 32 Ubuntu x
NTFS 16 Pictures x
NTFS 64 Pictures x
NTFS 256 Pictures x
NTFS 1024 Pictures x
Ext 16 Pictures x
Ext 64 Pictures x
Ext 256 Pictures x
Ext 1024 Pictures x
NTFS 16 Crawl x
NTFS 64 Crawl x
NTFS 256 Crawl x
NTFS 1024 Crawl x
Ext 16 Crawl x
Ext 64 Crawl x
Ext 256 Crawl x
Ext 1024 Crawl x
Sum 3 8 5 3
% 15.8 42.1 26.3 15.8
The bold text are the sums of the upper values.
C. Zoubek et al. / Digital Investigation 16 (2016) S44eS54 S53presented algorithmwith high performance for reasonably
sized RAID systems that is able to handle RAID-0, RAID-1
and RAID-5.Conclusion and limitations
We conclude that the basic principle of reassembling
RAID systems with entropy based heuristics can be applied
with suitable thresholds and parameters. Our tests show
that, in most of the cases, a complete reassembly of the
RAID system including the automatic detection of all of the
RAID parameters was possible in adequate time. Our soft-
ware should be extensible in such a way as to support
RAID-3, RAID-4 and RAID-6 systems due to their conceptual
similarity to RAID-5. Due to the prevalence of common
parity distribution patterns of RAID-5 systems, the algo-
rithm is able to reassemble the RAID system regardless of
hard disk order.
However, the lack of parity information in RAID-0 sys-
tems makes the problem of determining the hard disk
order difﬁcult. Nevertheless, the types of encountered ﬁles
are of great relevance to the accuracy of ﬁnding the pa-
rameters. Large picture ﬁles are most beneﬁcial, while
small ﬁles of any type provide less information through
entropy analysis.
In case empty space on disks would not be zero-ﬁlled,
but initialized with random data (that typically has high
entropy), our approach would not work. Luckily, all current
RAID systems that we are aware of initialize the disks with
zeros only. Similarly, in case of encrypted ﬁle systems on
the RAID and fully encrypted images, which have a
(uniquely) high entropy across the entire image, the correct
parametrization can not be detected using our approach. In
such cases our approach does not help in reconstructing
the RAID volume, but in such cases we have to face the
much harder problem of breaking the encryption anyways.Outlook and future work
As mentioned before, the extension of the provided tool
for RAID-3, RAID-4 and RAID-6 systems is a viable next goal
in the development along with nested RAID types (Wu and
Chin, 2008).
In order to solve the hard disk order problem for RAID-0,
some amount of hard disks must be permuted to generate
potential disk orders fromwhich images can be generated.
In order to handle the factorial amount of work in
reasonable time, our tool could be easily extended to
distribute the workload in a cluster.
Finally, we could try to further improve the parameter
detection by adding other block measures, such as the hash
used by Garﬁnkel et al. (2010) as mentioned in Related
work.
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